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ABSTRACT: The onset of modern history in the sixteenth century coincided with the 
peaking of the Christian-Islamic East-West confrontation i  the Mediterranean d, 
concurrently, a North-South struggle within Europe. The resulting ascendancy of the 
innovative North resulted in the subjugation of the old Mediterranean power bases and of
the whole region. As the Mediterranean slid into underdevelopment, it became indue course 
the contesting ground of the Great Powers, whose world interests coincided or clashed with 
regional interests, while more and more of the region's territory fell under external 
domination. During the cold war era in particular, the Mediterranean returned to be a major 
theatre of confrontation between the powers of East and West, that contest intersecting with 
a widening divide between North and South. The end of the East-West contest has exposed 
the North-South gulf, and its potential for adversity, for what it is. Does the end of one 
divide promise to help heal the other, or simply to entrench it further? 
No region of the world as much as the Mediterranean 
can claim to have experienced, often been the main theatre 
of, the great divides of history. Once considered the centre 
of the world, if not the world itself, this sea and its littoral 
lost its centrality in international ffairs after the onset of 
"modern history" when, from being the central theatre of 
the Christian-Islamic East-West contest, it became 
engaged in a losing contest with the North. Subdued, it 
eventually resumed its importance once the new northern 
European powers had asserted themselves and proceeded 
to vie with one another for its domination and control. 
Returning to be the contesting round of world powers 
from East and West, the Mediterranean assumed the 
character of a geostrategic region. The reverse side of the 
specificity attached by such powers to the Mediterranean 
is the regional fragmentation induced by the same 
competing external powers and the unequal development 
of its component parts. Today, rapid changes in 
international relations following the end of the East-West 
contest appear to highlight he division between North and 
South. Whether this divide within the Mediterranean is set 
to deepen further or to progress towards its re-integration 
as a region seems to depend on how truly revolutionary the 
current changes turn out to be. 
Superpowers of Christianity and Islam 
Fernand Braudel can still speak of the Mediterranean 
world for the sixteenth century - as it were, the last fling of 
the region at being the centre of the world - and insist on 
the 'unity and coherence of the Mediterranean regions' 
despite the East-West contest raging within it (Braudel 
1972: 14, 134-38). A veritable East-West divide ran right 
along the middle of the Mediterranean, peaking in this 
period following centuries of holy war and crusades 
between the Christian West and the Muslim East. Two 
great Mediterranean empires, superpowers by the 
standards of the times, stood for two religions cum 
ideologies that underpinned the confrontation between 
them. Two fleets were commissioned for the domination 
of the sea, or in readiness for the big confrontation that 
both hoped might be avoided. In the West lay the Spanish 
empire, reaching its zenith when Holy Roman Emperor 
Charles V combined in his person the rule over the 
possessions of both the Austrian and Spanish house of 
Habsburg. No less intent on pursuing the confrontation 
between East and West was his successor Philip II, though 
his dominions were again restricted to Spain and its 
possessions. In the East lay the Ottoman empire under 
Suleiman the Magnificent, sprawling over the Balkan 
peninsula, Asia Minor and most of the Arab world. 
By and large the confrontation by this time had 
assumed the nature of a cold war, which both sides craved 
to win, but neither seemed keen on forcing. In the two 
main deployments ofthe fleets - the siege of Malta of 1565 
and the battle of Lepanto of 1571 - both sides displayed 
their inadequacy in the moment of truth. In 1565 the 
Spanish fleet did not seek out to destroy the Ottoman fleet 
anchored in Malta, 800 hundred miles (1500 km) away 
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from base, while the Turkish forces failed to take the 
island. And in 1571, when Christendom pooled its naval 
resources to descend upon and destroy the Ottoman fleet, 
the Christians did not know what to do next and proceeded 
to return home leaving Cyprus, the casus belli, in Ottoman 
hands. 
These episodes, combined with such developments a
the persecution and eventual expulsion of the Morisco 
population from Spain or the expulsion of Christian 
garrisons from their remaining outposts in North Africa, 
further affirmed and tidied the frontier between East and 
West. To all intents and purposes, that particular East-West 
conflict had stabilised by the later part of the sixteenth 
century and both the western and eastern empires were set 
to decline, in direct relation to the rise of northwestern 
Europe. A North-South contest emerged to replace the 
riparian one between East and West as the outstanding 
feature of international relations. If the Mediterranean's 
"unity and coherence" survived the worst of the East-West 
political contest, in the long run it did not survive that 
between North and South, and the way was open to 
fragmentation and underdevelopment. 
The very abandonment of the war with Turkey in the 
Mediterranean was in no small measure motivated by 
Spain's growing concern with problems and interests to 
her North and West, up and away from the Mediterranean. 
But Spain could not for long hold on to the rebellious 
Dutch provinces, nor to hold its own against he rising sea 
power of England, nor to sustain the pressure from France 
that in the course of the seventeenth century reduced it to 
a second rate power, turning it by 1713 into a surrogate of 
France and in the process denuded of its imperial 
possessions in Europe. Nor in the longer run was Spain 
able to hold on to the American empire that it proved 
incapable of even exploiting with effect. Up and away from 
the Mediterranean also looked Constantinople. After 
distracting itself with renewed warfare eastwards against 
Persia and towards the Indian Ocean, and making some 
more inroads into the Hungarian possessions of the 
Austrian Habsburgs, the Ottoman empire settled down to 
an interminable agony of decay, eaten up by restlessness 
among its subjects, by underdevelopment, and by foreign 
pressure from Austria and especially Russia, and ultimately 
depending for its continued existence on the protection 
first of France and later of Britain. 1) 
The New International Order and the Vertical Hierarchy 
of Power 
The background and framework respectively of this 
directional shift were the coming into being of the 
capitalist world-economy and the concomitant new 
international order. The western empire succumbed earlier 
than the eastern to the pressures from the North. Overall, 
this can be accounted for by the thesis that the assault on 
the power and pretensions of the Spanish and Austrian 
Habsburgs was a contest to dominate the new world- 
economy, whose core was the North and West of Europe, 
whereas for the time being the Ottoman empire was an 
autonomous ytem in itself (Wallerstein 1779: 1-36). In 
political terms it is explained by the expediency of the 
alliance between France and the Ottoman empire to deal 
with their common Habsburg enemies; and by the late- 
coming of Russia. In the long run, the Ottoman empire 
would be assailed by Austria and Russia from the 
northeast; by France from the southwest. 
Hence, the North-South conflict was in the first 
instance a contest within Europe, the ascendancy of the 
North becoming established in the course of the 
seventeenth century. While intra-European North-South 
tension corresponded with the abandonment of the 
crusade against the Muslim East, the resolution of the 
contest within the Christian world eventually released 
Europe to move in for the conquest of the Muslim empire 
in the second instance. During the long agony of the 
Ottoman empire, the one-time horizontal Christian- 
Muslim divide was stood vertically to become the 
Christian conquest of the Muslim and Muslim-controlled 
southern arc, from the Balkans to the Maghreb. 
Externally, the European order that was emerging in 
the sixteenth century was rendering the Mediterranean 
empires' "superpower" status as anachronistic as their 
religious-ideological war aims. The assertion of the 
principle of balance of power signalled a new international 
order reflecting the emergence of nation states and the 
demise of the traditional imperial hegemonistic order. In 
due course therefore it transpired that the real threat o the 
respective mpires came not so much from each other as 
from the modemising if nonetheless expansionist forces 
to their respective norths. Since the balance of power 
principle implied a Europe made up of several states of 
comparable power and relied therefore on the ability of 
consolidated nation-states to check the inordinate power 
of the traditional dynastic empires, the new international 
order was inseparable from the emerging North-South 
divide and the growing irrelevance of the East-West 
contest. The new international order reflected the visions 
of successful states and was appealed to to consolidate and 
promote their achievements. The prowess of the North in 
comparison with the Mediterranean manifested itself in 
the consolidation of the modernising nation-state, in 
success in manifacture and commerce, in the assertion of 
the middle class, in new internal political structures. The 
international political shifts unfolding in sixteenth century 
Europe are both cause and effect of changes taking place - 
or refusing to take place - within individual states. 
Internally, both Mediterranean empires bore within 
them the seeds of their own destruction even as they still 
posed as superpowers, and on account of that: 
over-extension and the cost of war, fossilised and top- 
heavy socio-political structures based on privilege and on 
the subjugation and exploitation of their subjects' 
enterprise and resources - on the whole an anti-national 
community at the convenience of the anti-productive state 
rather than a nation-state at the service of the productive 
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community. While the apparatus of empire shielded the 
traditional centres of power in the south from the great 
economic, social and political changes taking place further 
North, the South became reactionary. Perhaps nothing 
expresses it better than the successful revolt of the 
enterprising Netherlands against predatory Spain in the 
later sixteenth and early seventeenth century. 
The contemporary coming into being of the "world- 
economy" and the competition between the established 
powers, notably Spain of Charles V, and the new 
challengers for the greater share, if not control, of it found 
the latter better equipped than the former. By the time that, 
in the seventeenth century, the political ascendancy of the 
North began to be visible, northern powers like England 
and the United Provinces had established themselves as 
"core states", relegating Spain and the traditional trading 
centres in Italy to the "semi-periphery" within the 
international economic hierachy (Wallerstein 1979: 38). 
From the North Atlantic, the English and the Dutch 
descended into the Mediterranean and captured the lion's 
share of its trade, enhancing their own economic 
development in direct proportion to the economic decline 
they helped to accelerate in the Mediterranean (Rapp 
1975). 2) In short, as the Mediterranean powers slid behind, 
the northern powers turned their eyes to dominate it, for 
commercial, territorial and strategic purposes. 
The emerging ascendancy of the North over the South 
was of course a long drawn out process more discernible in 
historical retrospect than to the contemporary e es which 
contemplated the "golden age" of Spain under Philip II or 
the "magnificence" and seemingly irresistible xpansion of 
Ottoman power under Suleiman II. But the symptoms 
were there already in the early decades of the sixteenth 
century. In the context of the Habsburg-Valois struggle, 
Francis I of France was severing the balance of power not 
only in resisting the hegemonistic drive of Charles V, but 
also in striking alliances with the Ottoman Porte. The 
enduring formation of two intersecting axes, the Spanish- 
Austrian and the French-Ottoman, was in itself a sign that 
the Christian-Islamic contest - even as it appeared to be 
the driving force behind the East-West confrontation i  the 
Mediterranean - was abhorrent to the new international 
order, because the Christian world itself was gripped by a 
contradiction between economic and political power. 
Indicative of the new order was rather the Christian- 
Christian contest inaugurated by the Protestant 
Reformation which, though running concurrently with the 
Christian-Islamic East-West contest, superseded it as the 
religious-ideological contest par excellence. Catching on 
in the North of Europe in rebellious defiance of the 
traditional power-bases ofthe South, no movement depicts 
more graphically the growing divide between the 
innovative North and the conservative South, where the 
Counter- Reformation held sway. In particular, in both the 
short and the long run, the power of the Catholic Habsburg 
was first contained and then cut to a managable size. 
Though in different ways and on different time-scales, both 
the Spanish and the Austrian Habsburg empires were in 
the first place reduced within the context of the complex 
warfare between Catholics and Protestants, a befitting 
outcome for empires where religious and political 
hegemony were both the means and the end to each other. 
The vicissitudes of Austria best depict the reversed 
direction of the hierarchy of power in Europe. With the 
new international order denoting a diplomatic rebellion 
against the ascendancy of the Holy Roman Emperors, 
Austrian pretensions to its North were defeated in stages, 
whereas new opportunities for expansion opened up to its 
South. Between the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) and the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648) Austrian hopes to unite and 
rule over Germany were smashed. Two centuries later her 
exclusion from a Germany about o be united was sealed at 
Sadowa/K6niggr~itz (1866). On the other hand, Austria was 
a decided beneficiary from the decline of the two one-time 
great Mediterranean empires, respectively her friend and 
foe. At Carlowitz (1699) Austria recovered Hungary from 
Turkey and at Utrecht (1713) she inherited most of Spain's 
Italian possessions, aswell as the Spanish Netherlands. Her 
expulsion from Italy and exclusion from Germany in the 
nineteenth century further reinforced the southeastward 
thrust of her ambitions, bringing it into perilious 
competition with another eastern empire, Russia. In the 
long run, the anti-national Austrian empire survived as 
long as is did, as an anachronistic relic of a different 
historical era, because its existence was convenient for that 
same balance of power it once negated. In this respect, its 
condition was similar to that of the Ottoamn empire itself. 
Both died a violent death in 1918, but then, the balance of 
power principle was utterly discredited anyway and the 
victorious powers were once again groping for a new 
international order. 
For a long time yet, however, France would be Austria's 
counterpart both on the continent and in the 
Mediterranean. Having spearheaded the break-down of 
the inordinate power of the Habsburgs, the Valois and the 
Bourbons' own bid for hegemony in its turn encountered 
the collective resistence of the other powers, who 
redressed the balance notably at Utrecht (1713), Aix-la- 
Chapelle (1748) and Vienna (1815). In the Mediterranean, 
Austria's kinship with Spain and hostility to Turkey led to 
its inheriting territory from the former and reconquer it
from the latter. France, on the other hand, by hostility and 
subjugation in Spain, and by friendship, influence, 
capitulations and ultimately conquest in the Ottoman 
empire, became pretender to the mastery of the 
Mediterranean. Due to checks in continental Europe and 
possibilities in the Mediterranean, the expansionist 
orientation of these adverse heirs of adverse empires -
France and Austria - became increasingly Mediterranean. 
For that way lay weakness and the opportunity for 
conquest. Legitimately as much European as 
Mediterranean, they were two in the four-power equation 
that emerged in the nineteenth century struggle for 
mastery in the Mediterranean. Peripherally European 
and not Mediterranean, the other two were Britain and 
Russia. 
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The decline and subjugation of the Mediterranean, 
incipient in the sixteenth century, matured in the course of 
the seventeenth. By the early eighteenth century, the 
Mediterranean lay exhausted. The bounty of 
Mediterranean commerce that had so attracted the 
attention of the North, was on one hand superseded by the 
promise of commercial pastures and empire further 
overseas, on the other emaciated by aggressive xternal 
competition and by prolonged warfare and its after effects. 
Besides its intrinsic ruinous nature, warfare promoted 
another scourge, corsairing, to Mediterranean 
communications and commerce. As much a sypmtom as 
an abettor of decline, corsairing was no new phenomenon 
to the Mediterranean, and under some aspects was the tail 
end of the Christian-Islamic war. But the facility of corsairs 
to operate within a context of chronic warfare gave a new 
lease of life to this form of terrorism, enabling it to linger 
on for another century. 3) Persisting into the nineteenth 
century it ultimately provided, in the form of punitive 
expeditions, a good subterfuge for the European 
penetration of North Africa. In the tradition of the 
Christian-Islamic contest, where Christianity had failed as 
a western force to subdue Islam, it succeeded as a northern, 
colonial, force. 
Atlantic Britain, Europe's "Southern Flank" 
and "Containment" 
Very significantly, the prominent featuring of the 
Mediterranean in essentially European warfare and the 
determining role of sea-power to such wars had other far- 
reaching effects on the region's place within a world whose 
parameters had grown very large since the Mediterranean 
last occupied the central place in it. For just as the Inland 
Sea was beginning to look like a backwater by dint of losing 
its vitality, it was also assuming a new function - and 
importance - precisely in the conduct of those wars which 
hastened its eclipse and fostered its underdevelopment. 
The function of Europe's southern flank unfolded in 
particular during the wars against France, notably the Wars 
of the Spanish Succession and those of the Austrian 
Succession during the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Not surprisingly, it was chiefly to the rising sea power of 
Britain, a North Atlantic power, that it appealed. Britain 
had earlier entered the Mediterranean for commerce: now 
it stayed on to dominate it for strategic reasons. The 
function that Britain gave the Mediterranean, i  relation to 
southern Europe in the first place., was eventually extended 
in relation to the other hinterlands beyond the 
Mediterranean coast, notably the Balkans, Western Asia 
and East Africa. Britain was the first of the modern great 
powers to view the Mediterranean as a single geostrategic 
unit. Having given up Tangier in 1684 after holding it for 
just over twenty years, Britain captured Gibraltar and 
Minorca in 1704 and 1708, during the Spanish Succession 
Wars. From here onwards, Britain installed itself as the 
dominant power in the Mediterranean, though it would 
take another century to make that position effective. It 
could control all entry and exit from the doorway of 
Gibraltar, or prevent he French Toulon fleet from making 
contact with the Brest fleet. It could use its considerable 
sea power to transport roops from one part of southern 
Europe to another. Most importantly, it could monitor, 
influence or intervene in any development taking place on 
the Mediterranean shores. It could seek out and destroy 
Bonaparte's fleet in Egypt or defeat his continental system 
in Europe; influence the movement of independence in
Greece and Italy so that they do not develop into 
surrogates of Russia or France, respectively; shore up the 
sick Ottoman empire to frustrate Russian hegemonistic 
designs and pursue a policy of containment against it while 
blocking its access to the Mediterranean; show the flag in 
Morocco or in Genoa, or wherever awarning needed to be 
served to the French; support the Triple Alliance by 
affording a degree of security to the two southern 
members, Italy and Austria-Hungary, by entering the 
Mediterranean Agreements in 1887; and generally watch 
out for the balance of power in Europe and guard its own 
more global interests. In the course of the nineteenth 
century, imperial Britain was less concerned with 
Mediterranean territory than with the sea. Itself an island 
whose security is guarded by a Channel, its concern in the 
Mediterranean was the possession or control of strategic 
islands and channels - Malta, the Ionian islands 
(temporarily), Cypus; the Straits of Gibraltar (through the 
possession of the Rock), the Straits of the Dardanelles and 
Bosphorus (through influence in Constantinople), the 
Suez Canal (through the occupation of Egypt). 
The eastern counterpart and competitor of Britain is 
Russia, handicapped in the competition by a century's 
delay in registering its interest and by a century's interval 
between the definitive onset of decline in Spain and in 
Turkey. Where Britain's occasion for installing itself as the 
leading sea-power in the Mediterranean was the French 
subjugation of Spain and, in turn, the wars to contain 
France, Russia's penetration of the Mediterranean 
depended on the resilience of the Ottoman empire, despite 
its internal ailments till a formidable sea and land power 
by the early eighteenth century. A latecomer both in 
European and world affairs, Russia under Peter the Great 
sought o open a window on the West and break an entry 
into the South. In both the short and the long run, 
penetrating the West proved more practicable, in the Baltic 
Sea against Sweden, on the continent (under Catherine) 
into Poland. The journey to the Mediterranean was long 
and hazardous. All Peter managed was the Port of Azov on 
the Black Sea. But beyond Azov there were still the straits 
of the Crimea, and across the Black Sea the Bosphorus and 
the Dardanelles. Catherine made real headway when she 
conquered from Turkey the entire northern shore of the 
Black Sea and rights of interference in the Orthodox parts 
of the Ottoman empire in Europe, as well as a free passage 
for Russian merchant shipping through the Straits.The 
Christian-Muslim East-West contest long since having 
been abandoned, Catherine the Great picked it up again, 
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this time in a North-South direction, spicing it with the 
contemporary spirit of enlightement that Turkey in Europe 
seemed a negation of, and with the other ideological 
vehicle of panslavism. Her successors never let go the 
crusading banner in their relentless drive to liquidate the 
Ottoman empire. Making inroads into it on both the 
European and Asian fronts, they were protagonists in the 
most complex and long-lasting international issue of the 
nineteenth century~ the Eastern Question. To Russia, the 
South, the Mediterranean, represented the dual function 
of expansion, free access to the open seas, political 
influence, on one hand; on the other, the security of the 
approaches, especially the Straits, to its own soft 
underbelly in the Black Sea. 
In trying to achieve its objectives in the nineteenth 
century, Russia had to reckon mainly with the opposition 
of Britain, concerned about the Asian approaches to her 
position in India, the potential challenge to her own sea 
power and the European balance of power which the ever- 
expanding Russia appeared to threaten. The new East-West 
contest in the Mediterranean that developed uring the 
nineteenth century therefore had as its protagonists non- 
Mediterranean world empires from the North. In pursuing, 
this contest - a coldwar but for the Crimean War of 1854-56 
- Britain adopted apolicy of containment against Russia, in 
Europe by upholding the balance of power, in the 
Mediterranean and western Asia by patronizing regional 
states. 
Having, by sinking Napoleon's fleet at Aboukir, warded 
off the French bid to capture the Middle East and thence 
improve France's chances in the competition for India, it 
was mainly with Russia in mind that Britain henceforth 
endeavoured to organize the "northern tier" territories 
into a buffer. Even as both powers reckoned with the 
common enemy, Napoleonic France, Britain in 1809 signed 
treaties with Persia, Afghanistan, the Sind and the Punjab, 
aiming thus to block the likely land approaches to India 
(Gillard 1977: 13-14). Patronage of the Ottoman empire 
followed logically. To the west, Britain had concurrently 
installed itself as a resident Mediterranean power through 
the acquisition of Malta and the Ionian Islands and shed its 
remaining doubts as to the value of maintaining a strong 
naval presence there after the war. British ambivalence in
the war of Greek independence of the 1820s already 
revealed its concern that the Ottoman empire's breakdown 
was in the interst of Russia. Protection of the empire 
became the corner stone of containment from the 
Mediterranean, otably after the Russo-Turldsh treaty of 
Unkiar-Skelessi (1833-1841) lapsed and Britain saw to it 
that it was replaced by the international Straits 
Convention. Tightened by means of war in the Treaty of 
Paris (1856), containment was preserved by a collective 
security arrangement in the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The 
short-lived Mediterranean Agreements (1887-1892) 
effectively linked Europe with Asia in the cordon of 
containment. 
Containment was not remarkably successful. In the 
"Great Game" as the pursuit of Ango-Russian rivalry in 
Asia was referred to, Britain failed to arrest Russian 
encroachment into central Asia and lost the upper hand 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, although 
the feared Russian inroad into India did not materialize 
(Chamberlain 1974: 133-153). In the Mediterranean, the 
fragmentation of Bulgaria and its denial of a 
Mediterranean coast at the Congress of Berlin was 
regretted when Bulgaria threw over Russian protection. 
The Mediterranean Agreements, which Britain wanted to 
focus on the protection of Bulgaria in the East in 
preference to the protection of Italy in the West (Lowe 
1965: 1-53), supported a Germanic alliance that soon 
emerged as the more serious threat to British interests. 
What had survived of the Ottoman empire fell under 
German influence. Both Bulgaria and the Ottoman empire 
fought against Britain and her allies in the First World War. 
In 1907, Britain and Russia resolved their differences in 
Asia by negotiation. During World War I, the wartime allies 
agreed on the partition of the remaining Ottoman empire, 
with Russia being promised Constantinople, no less. 
Imperialism in the Era of European Nationalism 
Especially before the discovery of oil in the Middle East 
early in the twentieth century, the Mediterranean theatre 
in this particular East-West contest featured primarily in 
the political objectives of the two main contestants, even if 
they possessed and expanded world empires for economic 
reasons. When colonial empire was held to be enhancing 
to a state's economic strength, neither Britain nor Russia 
can be said to have sought colonial territory in the 
Mediterranean for its own sake, although of course the 
Mediterranean itself was not shunned as an economic 
region. The same however could not be said of riparian 
states, namely France, Austria and unified Italy, to whom 
the territories of the region possessed intrinsic value, that 
is to say, worth appropriating. All three cast their eyes on 
the possessions of the Ottoman empire. After the 
unsuccessful bid by Napoleon for Egypt and Syria, France 
eventually conquered and colonised Algeria, Tunesia and, 
early in the twentieth century, hitherto independent 
Morocco. Austria, no newcomer in the Balkans, aimed at 
those portions of the Ottoman Balkans contiguous to it, 
especially after the resolution of the German question, and 
acquired Bosnia-Hercegovina i  1878 and 1908. Just before 
the First World War, Italy conquered and proceeded to 
colonise Libya, pointing the way to a future imperial claim 
on the Mediterranean. Even within the Mediterranean 
itself, the North had conquered the South by the early 
twentieth century. 
A measure of how stark the North-South division in the 
Mediterranean continued to become, with a hierarchy of 
power - and equivalent levels of economic development - 
moving from North to South, is the experience of 
nationalism. Nationalism, the great political hallmark of 
nineteenth century Europe, though it manifested itself in 
the Mediterranean as it did elsewhere in Europe - more, 
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considering the sharper contradiction between state and 
nation - was invariably subjected to the directorate of the 
Big Powers. Of the two chief national unifications in 
Europe, where that of Germany was achieved entirely on 
its own steam, that of Italy had to rely on the military 
support of France and the benevolent aquiescence of 
Britain. Following unification, Germany became the 
ascendant power in Europe; Italy lived in fear of France 
and needed the support of Germany on the continent, of 
Britain in the Mediterranean. Other nationalisms were 
either thwarted or denied outright. Balkan nationalism in 
particular, where it had success, depended as much on the 
considerations of competing big powers as it did on the 
resilience of the communities concerned. The resulting 
Balkanization, with all its entailed limitations and rivalries, 
frustrated national aspirations as much as it realised them 
and sowed the seeds of future conflict and persisting 
underdevelopment. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, nationalist 
revival merely led to its transfer from one empire to 
another; something similar can be said of Albania. The 
non-European Mediterranean was altogether a different 
story. In North Africa, as noted, not only were national 
aspirations quashed, but formerly independent or semi- 
autonomous territories fell into European hands. Egypt, 
quasi-independent wi hin the Ottoman empire and at one 
point even aspirant to its succession, first lost control over 
its own government o European creditors by going 
bankrupt and then fell under British occupation. 
How colonial the non-European Mediterranean 
continued to be regarded becomes the more striking after 
the First World War. The new international order outlined 
to replace what now seemed to have been the treacherous 
balance of power, rested among other things on the 
principles of self-determination and collective security, 
with the League of Nations a central instrument of such an 
order. Out of the four vanquished empires, the liberated 
European territories were released and encouraged to 
form into sovereign national states. The liberated 
territories of the Ottoman empire in the Middle East, on 
the other hand, were shared out between the British and 
the French under League of Nations mandates. As for 
North Africa, it remained firmly in the hands of the 
victorious allied powers. Only Turkey secured sovereign 
national status, and that through military success. 
The Cotemporary Mediterranean World: 
Old Wine in New Bottles 
In the two world phenomena - the cold war and 
decolonisation- that followed the end of the Second World 
War, the Mediterranean was a proto-international system. 
The cold war being an East-West contest, and the struggle 
for independence and later against neo-colonialism a
North-South contest, the Mediterranean contained 
ingrained experience and legacies of both. Once again, an 
East-West and a North-South tension intersected in the 
Mediterranean, 4~ under some aspects intertwining and 
under others entangling with each other, but in any case 
fostering further fragmentation within the region, even as 
the protagonists of contemporary international relations 
ascribed to the Mediterranean a geostrategic unity. 
As for the East-West contest, the Mediterranean 
featured in the very conception of the cold war long before 
the Second World War ended, when Britain and the 
reluctant United States pursued the war in the 
Mediterranean while starving the Soviet Union of a 
Second Front. In the later stages of the war, Churchill and 
Stalin were still discussing their future in the 
Mediterranean in the same terms as their British and 
Russian counterparts might have discussed them a century 
earlier. In October 1944, in a dress rehearsal of Yalta, the 
two statesmen clinched at Moscow the "percentages 
agreement" over the former site of the Eastern Question, 
with Britain (still guarantor of neutral Turkey) retaining 
Mediterranean Greece, and the Soviet Union most of the 
Balkan hinterland, as spheres of influence, while decision 
over Yugoslavia was procrastinated by the 50-50 per cent 
formula. At the close of the war, Stalin might well have 
been a Romanov, in demanding from Turkey the right to 
have Russian bases in the Straits and the return of Kars 
and Ardahan in Turkish Armenia, and Churchill a 
Palmerston in backing Turkey to say no (Carlton 1983; 
Rothwell 1982: 358-405). 
The early twentieth century abandonment of Anglo- 
Russian differences had been rendered possible by 
Britain's realisation that, like Russia (and of course its ally, 
France) the real threat o its interests came from Germany. 
During the Second World War, circumstances once again 
had led Britain and Russia to shelve their differences and 
make common cause, if not common front, against the 
common enemy, Germany. The impending defeat of 
Germany eliminated the necessity of cohabitation and 
restored the conditions for the traditional Anglo-Russian 
adversity to reassert i self, at a point in time when the post- 
war role of the United States was still uncertain. This 
implied an urgent resumption of the nineteenth century 
cross-Mediterranean East-West confrontation, with the 
region and the sea itself a vital link between Europe and 
Asia. The patronage of Greece, the asserted British 
guarantee of Turkey, the upholding of the Montreaux 
Convention on the Straits, the row with the Russians over 
the latter's hesitation in withdrawing from northern Iran, 
the installation of Commonwealth troops in Venezia 
Giulia to check Tito's advance into Italy - these end-of-war 
stances follow the all too familiar pattern constructed by 
Britain in th nineteenth century against Imperial Russia. 
Btl~ for the time being, containment was pursued 
piecemeal and opportunistically, in the shape of putting 
stops wherever gaps appeared, rather than a co-ordinated 
strategy which Britain in any case was no longer capable of 
organizing. While Roosevelt might disapprove of the 
cynicism of the "percentages agreement", his successor 
Truman followed the same line of thinking when he led the 
United States into Britain's shoes in the Mediterranean, 
whence in Europe, Asia, and the world. He set off by 
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making Greece and Turkey the first test cases of his 
"Doctrine" in 1947, shrouded as it was in the ideological 
mantle of the cold war that the Doctrine institutionalised. 
Parallel to its policy of containing Russia in southeas- 
tern Europe and Asia, nineteenth century Britain had used 
its paramount position in the Mediterranean to influence 
events in western Europe, the potential adversary here 
being usually France, since Russia had been kept bottled 
up in the Black Sea. This function of the Mediterranean as 
Europe's southern flank was after the Second World War 
recognised by the western allies within the new context of 
the EastCWest division of Europe, where this time, the ad- 
versary was the same Soviet Union. The defence of Western 
Europe was a distinct regional strategy before containment 
was formulated as a global strategy. The regional strategic 
function as Europe's southern flank was sealed by the 
decision 1:o include non-Atlantic Italy in NATO when it was 
launched in 1949, although it had not been among the core 
group of the Brussels Treaty founded the previous year. 
When Turkey, seeing that NATO was not being 
exclusive about its Atlantic personality, asked to be 
admitted as a member, it was still thought sufficient at first 
for the West to reassure Turkey that its own security was 
taken care of by the American guarantee that was built 
upon the Anglo-French guarantee of 1939. The picture 
changed when the start of the Korean War in 1950 inspired 
the notion of co-ordinated containment on a world scale. 
From that point onwards it was inevitable that the kernel 
of the former Ottoman empire should assume a key 
position in the scheme. Just as, in the nineteenth century, 
British concern for its position in distant India had 
influenced to a high degree the formulation of its eastern 
Mediterranean and western Asian policies, likewise the 
Korean War in the Far East was crucial in the role that the 
American-led West allocated to the same areas. Inasmuch 
as the Korean War signalled the world-wide spread of the 
cold war, the Mediterranean once more assumed a 
strategic importance in relation to the world, additional 
and complementary to its importance in relation to 
Europe. Straddling Europe and Asia, Turkey was placed to 
play a vital role forging contiguity between the existing 
NATO group and the projected organisation of the 
"northern tier" countries in western Asia. Once Greece and 
Turkey were clamped on to NATO (1952), Britain on behalf 
of the West put together the Baghdad Pact (1955). When 
Britain lost the Middle East at Suez, Eisenhower extended 
another "Doctrine" for the region in 1957, replicating 
Truman's committment o the Aegean neighbours a 
decade earlier. Meanwhile, the Balkan Pact (1954) 
attempted to supply the missing link in the contiguity of 
the containment chain by roping in Yugoslavia. The fierce 
independence of Tito could not allow the Balkan Pact to 
develop into an extension of NATO, even had the Greco- 
Turkish squabble over Cyprus not killed the Pact anyway. 
However, that same independence, sustained by American 
reassurance, meant that once again Russia fell short of 
reaching the shores of the Mediterranean, especially since 
Albania later on defected also. 
In the later nineteenth century British statesmen had 
come to perceive an Anglo-Russian war to be "in the logic 
of history" (Chamberlain 1974: 134-149). Given all the 
precedents where the United States adopted as its own, 
despite original hesitation, hitherto British policies where 
Russia was concerned each time it stepped in to inherit 
hitherto British positions and commitments, the Atlantic 
"special relationship" that developed between Britain and 
the United States equally lay "in the logic of history". Just 
as, in the "Great Game", the assiduousness with which 
Britain sought to contain Russia was not matched by too 
remarkable a success, similarly containment within the 
context of the East-West Cold War did not deliver lasting 
results. Neither the Baghdad Pact and its successor 
CENTO nor SEATO further east acquired the cohesion 
necessary to make them effective as a barrier against he 
Soviet Union. Ultimately, the failure of containment was 
exposed for what it was when the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979, hot on the heels of American's loss of 
a major regional ally in Iran. Not surprisingly, that failure 
blew the whistle for the start of the second cold war. On the 
other hand, the poor cohesion of anti-Soviet alliances in 
the Middle East and Central Asia contrasts with that of 
NATO in Western Europe and the Mediterranean which, 
despite many shocks along the way, outlived the Cold War 
itself and is now lost for an enemy. 
Imperialism in a Bipolar World 
For when all is said and done the East-West contest 
belonged in Europe, not only because it was there that the 
iron curtain was most clearly drawn, but because it was in 
Europe that the essential ingredients - and values - of the 
East-West contest existed, namely, advanced capitalism 
cure liberal democracy and communism. Whereas in the 
generally-speaking developed countries the fear of 
communism was easy to sustain, many countries of the 
Third World had little in material terms that communism 
either threatened or could be grafted on. "From the point 
of view of the weaker governments", it has been suggested, 
"the Cold War has been conducted by methods imilar to 
those employed in the Great Game, although the 
'civilizing missions' to which they have been incidentally 
subjected have changed in character" (Gillard 1977: 181). As 
it turned out, the "civilizing missions" of both West and 
East remained as alien to countries on the periphery of the 
core bloc of Europe (with its Atlantic extension) as their 
nineteenth century equivalent had been. Indeed in many 
parts of the Mediterranean and Middle East, what the West 
stood for moved from being irrelevant to antagonistic. For 
what, in the prevalent post-war situation, acquired the 
appellation of "West" too clearly coincided, from this 
standpoint, with the traditional colonial powers and forces 
of the North. That Turkey, despite its underdevelopment, 
does not fall within this group is as much a result of its 
non-colonial past and its European calling as it is of the 
critical strategic importance attached to it by the West 
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and, conversely, its own real fear of the bodering Soviet 
Union. 
Where French interest in the Arab Mediterranean had 
been mainly colonial, nineteenth century Britain had 
effected to be the dominant power in the region for 
essentially strategic reasons. After Fashoda (1898), Britain 
even traded recognition of French control over Saharan 
Africa for its own retention of the Sudan in virtue of Egypt. 
However, the discovery of oil in the Middle East early in 
the twentieth century combined important economic 
interests with the traditional British strategic interests in 
the region. Hence, after the Second World War Britain 
remained reluctant o give up its positions even after it 
gave independence to India and began handing over to the 
United States its traditional role in the Mediterranean. 
Though manifesting itself differently, the persistent 
imperialist mentality in the Mediterranean ofboth France 
and Britain meant that they had to be forced out of their 
colonial or para-colonial positions, leaving behind a 
resentment proportional to the difficulty of forcing them 
out. The results were particularly visible in Egypt and 
Algeria, and later on even more explicitely in Libya, the last 
to shake off Western control. The first anti-European 
backlash during the Arab struggle for independence was 
followed by the next wave of resistance to neo-colonialism, 
chiefly directed at the United States. 
Since the personality of the former imperialists from 
the North now merged into that of the West, and since 
moreover the United States installed itself in the 
Mediterranean asboth the leading western power and the 
leading economic power in the developed world - with 
Middle Eastern oil to feed the economies of the developed 
world as its primary economic interest - it followed almost 
naturally that the anti-imperialist radical states hould lean, 
if anything, towards the eastern superpower. In this way, 
the North-South and the East-West divide converged. The 
same might be said for other regions in the world, but in 
the Mediterranean it is more visible because it borders 
directly the core of the one and same northern and western 
bloc. Furthermore, of course, the anti-western front of 
Arab radical politics was consolidated, and legitimized 
even in conservative Arab eyes, by the overt American 
support of Israel, easily perceived as the agent of continued 
western imperialism. The Arab-Israeli conflict owering so 
high in Middle Eastern politics, it is hardly surprising that 
Anglo-American efforts to persuade Arabs to make the 
East-West contest their own met with little success. On the 
other hand, despite the natural abhorrence of communism 
to Islam, the combination of anti-imperialist reaction and 
Israeli enmity opened doors for Soviet patronage in a 
region hitherto unpenetrated by the Russians. 
Consideration of the gulf in levels of development 
between North and South within a world overshadowed by
the contest between East and West eventually found 
expression i the nonaligned movement, made up as it was 
largely of ex-colonial countries trying to resist both the 
bipolar pull of international relations and neocolonialism. 
Given the intersection of the East-West and the North- 
South divides within the Mediterranean, it is significant 
that two of the founding fathers of nonalignment, Tito and 
Nasser, should have hailed from two countries here. Where 
Tito's nonalignment was conceived in the original heat of 
the Cold War and inspired by the condition of striding the 
political frontier between two blocs in Europe (East-West), 
Nasser's chief inspiration was the persisting foreign 
influence in the Middle East and expressed more the Afro- 
Asian resistance to neocolonialism (North-South). The 
meeting of the two schools gave the movement i s formal 
character at the first summit of Belgrade in 1961 (Singham 
and Hume 1986: 13-27). If in the long run many nonaligned 
countries did not avoid being implicated in the East-West 
contest, bartering superpower influence for economic and 
political support in the form of patronage and aid, this was 
precisely because outside the formal power blocs the 
distinction between East-West and North-South was 
obscure from the start. 
The EC in the Mediterranean North-South Configuration 
On the other hand, and in direct contrast, within 
western Europe the East-West confrontation led to some 
erosion, such as was possible, of traditional North-South 
differences that traced their roots back to the sixteenth 
century. The programme of postwar European 
reconstruction, buttressed by Marshall Aid and other 
forms of American and western aid, reached out to include 
slow developers like Italy. Joining the Common Market as 
an original member, Italy's economic rescue further 
became the business of its partners to the North and it 
claimed the lion's share of EEC development funds, with a 
view notably to solving its own internal North-South 
problem. All long, the perception of the strong Italian 
Communist Party as a Troyan Horse accounted in no small 
way for the urgency of Italy's American and European 
partners to accelerate its economic development. Spain, 
whose political regime disqualified it from both Marshall 
Aid and the Common Market, became a direct beneficiary 
of American and American-inspired aid. Once democracy 
was restored, concurrently with Portugal, the way was open 
for joining the European Community, sensitive to the 
danger of a pendular swing to the Left. Further East, 
Greece's rapid accession to the EEC was similarly aided by 
the fear of a leftist reaction on account of American 
previous support to the Colonels' right wing regime 
(Pridham 1991). Thus, within the framework of the East- 
West contest, he European Mediterranean semi-periphery 
was intentionally attracted to the European core. 
From the Mediterranean standpoint, however, the 
rounding up of southern Europe into the EC core only 
deepened further the marine frontier between the 
northern and the southern shores. Prior to the two 
Mediterranean enlargements (1981 and 1986), the division 
had been buffered by the formulation of an EC "global" 
Mediterranean policy, providing aid and preferential 
trading terms to the non-member countries. By the time 
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of the last enlargement, two factors in particular 
undermined the continuing promise of this policy. One was 
the effects of the enlargements themselves, since the 
heavily agricultural and semi-industrialized conomies of 
the new members acquired first claim on the Euopean 
market at the expense of non-members with similar 
economies (Pomfret 1986: 98-100; 1989: 11-17). The other 
was the Single European Act of 1986 launching a new 
offensive in favour of deeper integration within the EC. 
While these latter developments were independant of 
the East-West divide, the relations between western 
Europe and the non-European Mediterranean acquired a 
new twist with the termination of the East-West contest. 
Not only was removed the political reason for admitting 
new states from the South into the EC, but a new semi- 
periphery suddenly opened up to the East in direct 
competition with the Mediterranean, hitherto the 
Community's preferred region. The lifting of the Iron 
Curtain and the abrupt disintegration of a hitherto 
complete system in the eastern half of the continent 
resulted in a scramble for some form of association with 
the European Community just when the latter was 
embarking on a new phase of integration that implied 
deepening rather than widening. The centripetal force of 
Brussels contrasts harply with the centrifugal force in the 
eastern half of Europe, as countries which have freshly 
recovered their sovereignty and nationhood dream of 
subsuming them again into that of"Europe". Faced with a 
stampede of applications and notices of applications for 
membership, the Community sorted them into three piles: 
the already developed EFTA countries; those of eastern 
Europe, and those from the Mediterranean. The fear of 
communism gone, and hence the days when Community 
membership might be a short cut for development being 
over, the EFTA group will get in first. 
Crisis of Nationalism 
The spectacle of nations at once fighting fiercely for 
their independence and longing to merge their identity into 
a Europe aiming, however piously, to transcend individual 
sovereignty, is tantamount to a reversal of history wherever 
national emancipation has not been matched by economic 
emancipation, as tough the substance of national 
fulfilment were reducable to success in capitalist erms. 
Gorbachev's warning to Honecker that those who are late 
will be punished by history (though ironically East 
Germany was the most rescuable), might easily be 
extented to all on Europe's periphery, with Some benefit of 
the doubt to eastern Europe, including Croatia and 
Slovenia, who have the excuse of recent foreign control. 
The nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth 
had seen the completion of Europe's constitution into 
"bourgeois" nation states, the apparent maturing of a 
historical process begun four centuries ealier, within the 
framework of that same international political and 
economic order that both reflected and served the 
ascendancy of the North over the South. Apart from the 
post-World War I national reconstruction of Eastern 
Europe, the three main loci of national unification and 
consolidation had been the north-centre (Germany), the 
south-centre (Italy) and the south-east (Yugoslavia). In the 
long run, the resilience of the national state turned out to 
be in direct relation to the distance from North and West. 
Recent years have witnessed consolidation i  Germany in 
the form of re-unification of East and West; strain in Italy 
in the form of the North's (Leagues') impatience with the 
South; outright decomposition i Yugoslavia in the form 
of the North's rebellion against he South. 
The contrast between the nationalist experience is 
particularly stark in the cases of Germany and Yugoslavia. 
In both cases reconstitution and disintegration 
respectively are directly but in contrasting ways linked, on 
one hand, with the end of the Cold War and on the other, 
with the economic performance of the dominant partner 
within the union. Both countries lived on the frontier of 
West and East. Twice aligned by force of circumstances - 
half to the East and half to the West - Germany recovered 
national unity at the urgent behest of East Germany (which 
thus also became the only territory ever to join the EC 
without applying). Cornered between East and West by 
circumstances, and delicately balanced between them by 
choice, Yugoslavia began falling apart when the more deve- 
loped North took flight from the hegemonising clutches of 
Serbia the moment hat the East-West confrontation dissol- 
ved. Ironically, fear of the Soviet Union had abetted to no 
small degree the de-Balkanization of that same state which 
had pioneered the rebellion against the hegemony of 
superpowers. The rest was owed to Tito's statesmanship 
and his penchant for compromise and experimentation in 
federalism. Ironically too, the strategem of 
decentralisation, though perhaps unavoidable, helped to 
widen the development gap between the North and South. 
When first Tito and later the Russian scare disappeared, it 
was the prosperous former Austro-Hungarian North that 
was quickest o run away from the once Ottoman South. 
The Ottoman Empire Revisited 
With the synonymity of the North and West becoming 
ever so obvious, the synonymity of East and South has 
been exposed. In the Mediterranean, the reversal of 
historical trends is such that one might as well bring back 
the nineteenth century term "Near East" into the parlance 
of international relations, and the late mediaeval "Levant" 
to describe those portions of Europe and the 
Mediterranean South-Southeast of the new iron curtain 
that seems to be emerging. It cannot be accidental that the 
apparent schism runs along the same frontier where the 
dominions of the Ottoman empire once reached into 
Europe and that it cuts through war-torn Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, the part of ex- Yugoslavia which belonged 
respectively toboth the Ottoman and the Austrian empires 
in the last decades of their existence. 
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Though qualitatively different and unrelated to the 
Soviet collapse, the crisis of nationalism - with all that 
entails to the crystallization of existing core-periphery 
relationships - is equally visible on the Afro-Asian 
precincts of the former Ottoman empire. The promise of 
Arab unity and renaissance, disappointed after the 
breakdown of the Ottoman empire and revived after 
independence from the European empires, has never been 
so distant. Even within the Arab world itself, hopes of 
integration of late have been scaled down to neighbourly 
constellations, and even so none too successful. In the 
West, the Arab Maghrebi Union, a sober alternative to the 
previous pate of abortive mergers, has not shown concrete 
signs of taking off. Despite the original objective of 
promoting economic integration, as much to meet the new 
challenges of dealing with an integrated Europe as to lay an 
economic base upon which to construct political 
integration, the countries concerned still contend with 
serious bilateral problems and trade more with Europe 
than with one another. They thus sustain a regional 
division of labour that has been more beneficial to Europe 
than to themselves. Across this side of the Mediterranean, 
two movements in particular, a physical and a cultural one, 
signal the widening gap between North and South: the 
wave of Europe-bound emigration and the upsurge of 
Islamic fundamentalism. The former a flight to richer 
pastures, the latter a disillusion with the imported, western, 
model of the national state and a recourse to Islam as the 
appropriate foundation of the Arab national state, both 
movements converge into one theme, namely, resignation 
to incompatibility. The hostility of Europe to immigrants 
and the Islamic revival being both grass-root trends, the 
gap is deepened even at the popular level on both sides, 
giving it a distinct flavour of a cultural Christian-Islamic 
cross-Mediterranean divide. 
If the AMU appears to have stalled, its Mashreq 
counterpart the Arab Co-operation Council was practically 
stillborn. Foundering under the strain of the Gulf Crisis 
instead of helping to resolve it "within the family", one 
member, Egypt, fought against another, Iraq, in the ensuing 
Gulf War that the Arab League was impotent o prevent. 
Only the Gulf Co-operation Council has shown signs of 
staying power. But this is attributable more to the common 
self interest of protecting oil revenues than to the Arab 
nationalist ideal or to any vision of an integrated economic 
system in a region where the vast financial resources of its 
members could combine with the equally vast human (and 
military) resources of their Arab neighbours. The 
reshuffling of regional alignments during the Gulf crisis for 
a while after the war promised to forge complementariety 
between the military resources of Egypt and Syria and the 
financial power of the GCC. However, the Damascus ix- 
plus-two initiative, a new base for Arab Co-operation and 
integration, quickly evaporated. 
The end of the East-West confrontation, the collapse of 
the Eurasian Soviet empire, the chronic failure of the Arab 
world to achieve integration, the outbreak and effects of 
the Gulf War - all combine to expose a number of 
peripheries that seem to restore a core potential to the 
historic centre of the Ottoman empire, Turkey. In a sense, 
picking up the challenge would imply the return to a 
historic role long ago rejected by Turkey and resisted since. 
It has been proposed that the coming into being of the 
Eurocentric capitalist world-system in the sixteenth 
century was independent of and parallel to that of the 
Ottoman empire, a world-system of itself (Wallerstein 
1987). That system in due course collapsed owing to the 
empire's internal contradictions, the external pressures 
from the North, and the long-term world ascendancy ofthe 
Euro-Atlantic economic system. The Kemalist Turkish 
nation reborn from the debris of the defeated Ottoman 
empire not only turned its back upon its imperial past but 
aimed to extricate itself from the Islamic Middle East by 
reaching out towards Europe. Seventy ears of adaption in 
persuit of its European calling have not however brought it 
close enough to the core, either in terms of economic 
development or of the Europeans' own perception of 
Turkey, and its application to join the EC stands all but 
rejected. Almost half a century of East-West confrontation 
have seemed to favour Turkey's western, if not European, 
aspirations, with Turkey playing the West's man in the 
Middle East in return. No sooner did the end of the Cold 
War threaten to weaken Turkey's strategic utility to the 
West than the Gulf Crisis brought back into relief its vital 
position between Europe and the oil of the Middle East. 
Yet if Turkey's erstwhile role in the defence of Europe from 
Soviet Russia still did not qualify it for EC membership, 
much less does its revamped role as an essentially Middle 
Eastern power. Turkey has for years been developing 
economic and political relations with its regional 
neighbours. In particular its control over and development 
of their regions's major water resources, and the use of its 
territory to carry oil by pipeline to the Mediterranean 
combine with its relatively advanced economic setup to 
cast it in a leading role for the economic integration of the 
region (Robins 1992). So long, Turkey still entertains the 
hope that its European vocation can be sealed irreversably, 
by an economic and political integration in Europe. But by 
the same token, a definitive rejection should encourage it
to revert to a historical role as a core Levantine state 
rallying around it the traditional peripheries. What remains 
to be seen is whether such a Levantine system, should it 
come about, would be complementary, subordinate to, or 
conflicting with the European. 
A Monroe Doctrine in Reverse? 
I f  the Mediterranean is all too clearly divided, the 
reverse side of that division is its interdependence, in 
economic as well as in political and security terms. As the 
division becomes more clear-cut, the decision whether to 
allow it to develop into confrontation or complementarity 
seems to rest, perhaps more than ever before in the last 
three centuries, on the regional actors themselves. Which 
renders increasingly ambiguous the role of the United 
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States in particular. Its utility to Europe is diminishing, as 
its superpower weight leans more and more on the South, 
from where it perceives that the threats to western (or 
northern, since the distinction does not seem to matter 
anymore) interests derive. There is of course nothing novel 
in this, except inasmuch as the ebb of the Soviet scare has 
highlighted and intensified it. It has indeed been suggested 
that the intensification of the Cold War from the late 1970s 
onwards was meant as a screen to cover the mounting 
offensive against he South, especially the Arab world, as 
evinced by the institution of the Rapid Deployment Force 
and the concentration of missiles in Sicily: "The 
Mediterranean is no longer NATO's southern flank against 
the Soviet Union, but NATO's central flank against the 
South' (Amin 1989: 15). 
There never has been a clear distinction between the 
military, political and economic objectives of the United 
States since it became a Mediterranean power to support 
the defence of Europe and to assume the committments of 
the former European empires (Smolansky et al. 1983; 
Rosenthal 1982: 100-115). However, in the pursuit of its 
objectives, the overbearing force of the East-West contest 
in international relations often blurred further the 
distinction between the United States acting on behalf of 
the political interests of the "free world" and the United 
States acting on behalf of the economic iterests of the 
"first world". It also tended to blur the distinction between 
action on behalf of the western alliance and action on 
behalf of' American national interest. American policy 
towards Iran, Egypt, Syria, Lybia and such states as at one 
time or other defied it, not as a Western, but as an 
"imperialist" power has often been explained in terms of 
such states' attachment to the Soviet Union. When not that, 
it has been explained in terms of such countries' 
implication in international awlessness. The obvious 
example is Lybia, several times the object of punitive 
action during the 1980s, and more recently put under UN 
sanctions. The progression to proponent of a New World 
Order to replace the world balance of power points in the 
same southward direction, where the political and 
economic objectives meet, as the first NWO test case in the 
Gulf demonstrated. 
New international orders however are not prescribed, 
but evolve in correspondence to real changes, and become 
meaningless propositions when, contrived in the euphoria 
of victory, aim to preserve the status quo against the 
pressures for change, as in the post-Napoleonic period, or 
lack the necessary objective conditions, as in the post 
World War 1 period. Besides, a contradiction between 
economic and military power has been exposed. After the 
sixteenth century, Euro-centricity was in harmony with an 
international order that provided the framework for 
political power to reflect economic strength. With the 
termination of the contemporary East-West contest, 
Europe again recovered centre-stage, in a condition of 
economic strength and despite its military weakness. 
Though on different scales, both Russia and the United 
States need Europe more than Europe needs them, and 
both are military stronger, even ifa threat from either is not 
contemplated. The project of an independent European 
defence, if achieved, could rectify the contradiction. Of 
course, the definition of defense, and from what, if 
anything in particular, is what matters more. 
Yet there are signs that Europe - geographically, 
historically, economically, politically and culturally part of 
the Mediterranean North-South configuration - is not 
insensitive to the security concerns of its neighbourhood. 
Thus, for example, during the detente and post-detente 
phases of the East-West division, convincing the 
Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) to include the whole Mediterranean basin within 
its scope has been an uphill struggle, encountering 
opposition otably from the superpowers (Agnoletti 1986; 
Abbadi 1984). s) On the other hand, the initiative for a 
Conference of Security and Co-operation in the 
Mediterranean (CSCM) launched in 1990 points to a 
European appreciation of the principle, though progress in 
substance remains to be registered. The critical importance 
of Euro-American relations to the future security of the 
Mediterranean has been recognized even in the heat of the 
second Cold War (eg Zoppo 1984). There have been indeed 
within the Mediterranean many points of American- 
European discord, over such issues as relations with anti- 
democratic regimes in southern Europe, the Palestinian 
Question, Libya, and the use of NATO facilities for 
purposes other than defence from the Soviet Union, in 
addition of course to free trade rows over the EC's 
preferential trading with the Mediterranean countries. 
Within the cold war context, it has been suggested that the 
Mediterranean can only achieve autonomy as a region, and 
hence more security and a more equitable division of 
labour, if Europe weans itself from American dependence 
(Amin 1989: 17-22). That presumes a Europe - now 
liberated from the Soviet security threat and the 
corresponding dependence on American defence - that 
recognizes a community of interests with its peripheries 
and gives priority to them. Whether it would necessitate 
some European Monroe- Doctrine-in-reverse i  something 
else9 
Conclusion: End of an Era? 
The shift from Mediterranean-centricity to Euro- 
Atlantic centricity at the onset of modern history ushered a
long era of neglect, foreign domination and fragmentation 
in the Mediterranean, the more so this century as the poles 
of international relations moved further out to the West 
and to the East. To date, it has been easier to talk of the 
Mediterranean region as a historical reality than as a 
contemporary one, given the potential for adversity - as 
opposed to diversity - that has existed and exists within 
and around it. Regionality has existed less in terms of the 
relationships between thedifferent parts of the 
Mediterranean oreven in the subjective perception of most 
Mediterranean ations, than in the reckoning of such 
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external competing world powers different parts of the 
Mediterranean or even in the subjective perception of 
must Mediterranean nations, than in the reckoning of such 
external competing world powers as were capable of 
treating it as a single geostrategic entity (Fenech 1991). 
Consequently and ironically, what has best defined the 
Mediterranean region in terms of international relations is 
not the complementarity of its component parts but, 
on the contrary, its being the converging point of 
global conflicts, with all the regional divisiveness that 
entailed. With one such outstanding lobal conflict 
just terminated, it certainly does appear that disparity 
and adversity within the Mediterranean are as rife as 
ever. Appearances apart, the question is whether the 
end of the East-West confrontation is liable to erode or 
to deepen the North-South division. Given 
the cancellation of some of the most important 
historical experiments that have characterized the 
twentieth century, the question seems to come down to a 
simple one: do we really stand at the end of a historical era, 
or are we simply witnessing the vengeance of a very old 
one? 
Footnotes 
1~ On the swing of Spanish and Ottoman attention away from the 
Mediterranean, see Braudel (1972), vol. ii, 1143-85. 
2~ Rapp contends that in the first instance the English and the 
Dutch owed their economic growth more to this penetration f 
the Mediterranean than to the exploitation of the new orld. 
3~ On this stage ofdecline of the Mediterranean, see Mathiex (1970). 
4) See the analysis by Luciani (1982). 
5~ The protraction of the CSCE meeting in Madrid by several weeks 
in the summer of 1983 until a compromise was reached over a 
proposal by Malta is probably the best illustration of such 
resistance. 
6) Rosenthal (1982), 138-39, postulated that mounting superpower 
tension might have motivated Europe to re-explore the Gaullist 
"Third Force Europe" as a "semi-impartial" mediating force in 
Mediterranean conflicts. 
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